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I. INTRODUCTION

The Constitutional State was conceived in the 1999 Venezuelan
Constitution, which is still formally in force, as a democratic and
social rule of law and state of justice.' As a democratic state, the
Constitution organized the state based upon the two most classic
principles of modern constitutionalism. On the one hand, the
principle of separation of powers is embodied by the distribution of
power among five autonomous branches of government (legislative, executive, judicial, electoral, and citizens). On the other
hand, as "a decentralized federal State,"2 the principle of the vertical distribution of public powers is found in three territorial levels
of government: national, state, and municipal levels.' In each of
such levels, the corresponding governments must always be of an
"elective, decentralized, alternative, responsible, plural, and of
revocable mandate" character.' That is, the political organization
of the nation must be based on the democratic principles,' as a
"democratic society,"6 of representative and participatory character.
As a social state, according to the extended declaration of rights,
particularly of social rights, it has social obligations established to
procure social justice, an objective which can bring the State to
intervene in social and economic activity as a welfare state. That
is why this Social State must seek for the application of the fundamental values of equality and solidarity, the preeminence of
human rights,' and the achievement of "social justice" as one of
the basis of the economic system.' That is why the economic sys1.

CoNSTITUTION OF THE BOLIVARIAN REPUBLIC OF VENEZUELA (1999), art. 2.

2. Id. at art. 4. See the study of the Constitution regarding the regulation of this
Constitutional State Model in ALLAN R. BREWER-CARIAS, LA CONSTITUCI6N DE 1999.
DERECHO CONSTITUCIONAL VENEZOLANO (2004) and ALLAN R. BREWER-CARIAS,
CONSTITUC1oN DE 1999 Y LA ENMIENDA CONSTITUCIONAL DE 2009 (2011).
3. CONSTITUTION OF THE BOLIVARIAN REPUBLIC OF VENEZUELA (1999), art. 136.

LA

4. Id. at art. 6.
5. Id. at arts. 2, 3, 5, 6.
6. Id. at pmbl.
7. Id. at pmbl, arts. 1, 21.
8. Id. at art. 299. On the social values in the Constitution, see Jacqueline Lejarza A.,
El cardcter normativo de los principios y valores en la Constituci6n de 1999, in 1 REVISTA
DE DERECHO CONSTITUCIONAL 195 (1999) and Liliana Fasciani, De la Justiciaa la Justicia

Social, in 1 TENDENCIAS ACTUALES DEL DERECHO CONSTITUCIONAL. HOMENAJE A JES0S
MARIA CASAL MONTBRUN 161 (Jesds Maria Casal, Alfredo Arismendi & Carlos Luis Carrillo
Artiles eds., 2008).
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tem was conceived in the Constitution as a mixed one, declaring
economic liberty and free private initiative, altogether with the
guaranty of private property, allowing State participation in the
economy, and in all cases with the purpose of satisfying social justice.
As a rule-of-law state (Estado de derecho), the Constitution expressly provides that all the organs of the State must always act
subject to and according to the provisions established in the Constitution and in the statutes enacted by the National Assembly.'
For such purpose, the Constitution is considered to be the "supreme law" of the land, and "the ground of the entire legal order,"
as it is declared in its Article 7, which in addition prescribes that
the provisions of the Constitution are obligatory for all branches of
government as well as for individuals.o In order to assure such
supremacy and enforceability, the Constitution has been conceived
as a very rigid one in the sense that it is only possible to modify it
through three procedures set forth in the Constitution, depending
on the importance and the scope of the modification proposed and
always with popular participation." The three procedures are
first, the convening of a national "Constituent Assembly" for the
whole transformation of the state, the "Constitutional reform" procedure for major constitutional changes, and the "Constitutional
Amendment" for minor constitutional changes. 2
Finally, as a state of justice, the organs of the state are the ones
called to guarantee and enforce the Constitution, and above all,
the fundamental rights (political, social, educational, cultural,
economic, and environmental rights) it declares, in order to assure
their enjoyment by all persons without any sort of discrimination.' 3
Also, as a state of justice, Article 334 of the Constitution, in order to assure its supremacy and the functioning of the State in all
its qualifications (democratic, rule of law, social and justice state),
9.

CONSTITUTION OF THE BOLIVARIAN REPUBLIC OF VENEZUELA (1999), arts. 137, 141.

10. Id. at arts. 7, 131.
11. See Allan R. Brewer-Carias, La intervenci6n del pueblo en la revisi6n constitucional
en Amdrica latina, in EL DERECHO POBLICO A LOS 100 NIIIMEROS DE LA REVISTA DE DERECHO
PGBLICO 1980-2005 41 (Allan R. Brewer-Carfas ed., 2006).
12.

CONSTITUTION OF THE BOLIVARIAN REPUBLIC OF VENEZUELA (1999), arts. 340 et

seq.; see Allan R. Brewer-Carfas, Los procedimientos de revisi6n constitucional en
Venezuela, in I PROCEDIMENTI DI REVISIONE COSTITUZIONALE NEL DIRITO COMPARATO 137
(Eduardo Rozo Aculia ed.) (1999); Allan R. Brewer-Carias, Modelos de revisi6n
constitucionalen Amirica Latina, 141 BOLETIN DE LA ACADEMIA DE CIENCIAS POLITICAS Y
SOCIALES 115 (2003).
13. CONSTITUTION OF THE BOLIVARIAN REPUBLIC OF VENEZUELA (1999), art. 21.
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assigns all courts and judges the duty "of guaranteeing the integrity of the Constitution" with the power to decide not to apply a
statute that they deemed to be unconstitutional when deciding a
particular case.
In addition, Article 335 of the Constitution also assigns the Supreme Tribunal of Justice the duty of guaranteeing "the supremacy and effectiveness of the constitutional rules and principles" as
"the maximum and final interpreter of the Constitution" with the
duty to seek for "its uniform interpretation and application."l 4 For
such purposes, the Constitution has organized a very extended
and comprehensive system of judicial review in order to assure the
enforceability of the Constitution, which combines the diffuse
method of judicial review with the concentrated method of judicial
review, assigning the latter to the Constitutional Chamber of the
Supreme Tribunal of Justice.' 5
Constitutionally speaking, therefore, the Venezuelan state was
constitutionalized according to all the general principles of modern
constitutionalism, namely, the principles of separation of powers,
representative democracy, political pluralism, political decentralization and participation, controlled government, and human
rights guarantees;'" established in a rigid way such that no change
to those principles can be made without reforming the Constitution. That is, for instance, from the democratic perspective, the
alternate form of government cannot be eliminated at any level of
government without a constitutional reform, and no political institution of the State can be created without ensuring its elective
character through elected representatives of the people by means
of universal, direct and secret suffrage; without guaranteeing its
political autonomy, which is essential to its decentralized nature;
and without guaranteeing its plural character in the sense that it
cannot be linked to a particular ideology.
Nonetheless, and in sharp contrast with the constitutional
framework of the Constitutional State, the most important current
constitutional issue in Venezuela is not its constitutionalization in
the
very
publicized
1999
Constitution,
but
the
14. Id. at art. 335.
15. See Allan R. Brewer-Carias, Judicial Review in Venezuela, 45 DUQ. L. REV. 439
(2007).
SOBRE
LA
REVOLUCI6N
R.
BREWER-CARIAS,
REFLEXIONES
16. See
ALLAN
NORTEAMERICANA
(1776),
LA REVOLUCION
FRANCESA (1789) Y LA REVOLUCION
HISPANOAMERICANA (1810-1830) Y SUS APORTES AL CONSTITUCIONALISMO MODERNO (2d ed.

2008).
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"deconstitutionalization" process of the Constitutional Democratic,
Social and Rule of Law State of Justice resulting from the now
one-decade-long systematic institutional demolition process, which
has been carried on by the authoritarian government installed in
the country since 1999, in the name of a so called "Bolivarian Revolution,"" which imposed a series of political and "constitutional"
changes in contempt of the Constitution and of its supremacy.
That is, during the past decade, almost all the basic principles of
the organization of the State and of the political system of the
country embodied in the Constitution have been changed without
following the formal constitutional review procedures set forth in
the Constitution. The Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme
Court of Justice has failed to enforce the Constitution regarding
the functioning of the State, refusing to guarantee its rigidity, allowing "constitutional reforms" to be sanctioned by means of ordinary legislation or even introducing "constitutional mutations" to
the Constitution changing its meaning through constitutional interpretations.
This paper has the purpose of highlighting the most recent expressions of such process of deconstitutionalization of the Constitutional State in Venezuela, which is the most important current
constitutional issue in the country. That process has been developed thanks to the actions and to the omissions of the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Tribunal of Justice, which as Constitutional Jurisdiction, has refused to consider constitutional issues as such, allowing instead, in the name of the "Bolivarian
Revolution," the introduction of changes in all the basic principles
embodied in the Constitution without a formal constitutional reform. The Supreme Tribunal, on the contrary, defrauding or in
degradation of the 1999 Constitution, has progressively allowed
the implementation of the so called new "twenty-first century Socialism" replacing the Constitutional State by a Communal State,
without formally reviewing the Constitution.

17. See ALLAN R. BREWER-CARtAS,
AUTHORITARIAN EXPERIMENT (2012).

DISMANTLING

DEMOCRACY.

THE

CHAVEZ
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II. THE GENERAL FRAMEWORK FOR THE
"DECONSTITUTIONALIZATION" PROCESS OF THE STATE: THE
"BOLIVARIAN" LABEL IN ORDER TO DISGUISE THE IMPLANTATION OF
A SOCIALIST OR COMMUNIST STATE, WITHOUT REFORMING THE
CONSTITUTION

One of the most distinguished and apparently formal changes to
the Venezuela Constitution adopted in 1999 was the new name
given to the Republic as "Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela" (article 1), in substitution of the two hundred years old name of "Republic of Venezuela."
That change of name and the parallel initiation of the political
changes derived from the "Bolivarian Revolution" was made by a
National Constituent Assembly that was convened and elected in
the same year of 1999 without being provided in the 1961 Constitution, that is, in violation of the constitutional review procedures
established in it." That 1999 elected Constituent Assembly was
completely controlled by the followers of the then recently elected
(1998) President Hugo Chdvez who, after thirteen years, still remains as the head of the Executive Power.

The motivation for the new name given to the country in 1999
was formally to refer to the ideas and actions of Sim6n Bolivar,

who not only was the "Liberator" of the Venezuelan territory at
the beginning of the Nineteenth Century in the wars that followed
the declaration of independence from Spain (1811), but also of other Latin American countries such as Colombia, Ecuador, Bolivia,
and Peru which have been historically called the "Bolivarian" republics. Among them, Venezuela is the one with the oldest constitutional tradition, beginning with the sanctioning of the Federal
Constitution of the United Provinces of Venezuela of December 21,
1811.19
18.

See on the 1999 constitution-making process, ALLAN R. BREWER-CARIAS, GOLPE DE

ESTADO Y PROCESO CONSTITUYENTE EN VENEZUELA (2002); Allan R. Brewer-Carias, The

1999 Venezuelan Constitution-Making Process as an Instrument for Framing the development of an AuthoritarianPoliticalRegime, in FRAMING THE STATE IN TIMES OF TRANSITION.

CASE STUDIES INCONSTITUTION MAKING 505 (Laura E. Miller ed.) (2010); Allan R. BrewerCarias, Constitution Making in Defraudationof the Constitution and Authoritarian GovThe Recent Venezuelan Experience, 19
ernment in Defraudation of Democracy.
LATEINAMERIKA ANALYSEN 119 (2008).

19. The 1811 Constitution was the first modem republican and democratic constitution
of Latin America, sanctioned by an elected congress following the principles of modern
constitutionalism derived from the French and American revolutions. That constitution
and all the papers of the independence process from Spain were conceived and written
without the participation of Sim6n Bolivar, who in fact began his influence in the country
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During and after the wars against Spain (1813-1824), Bolivar
participated in the subsequent constitution-making processes of
the country first, in 1819, reformulating the constitutional framework of the State proposing a new Constitution called Angostura;
and second, in 1821 by proposing the constitution of a new state,
the Republic of Colombia, which comprised the territories of what
is today Venezuela, Colombia, and Ecuador. These constitutions
(1819, 1821), in contrast with the 1811 Federal Constitution, organized a centralized state with militaristic roots derived from the
bitter independence wars.
In any case, as the name of Bolivar is so closely linked with the
initial organization of the State after the Independence, it has
been used for political purposes by many rulers and in many occasions in Venezuelan history, in order to attract followers or to give
some "doctrinal" basis to political regimes, mainly with military
and authoritarian roots. It was the case in the nineteenth century, of Antonio Guzmdn Blanco, and during the twentieth century,
of Cipriano Castro, Juan Vicente G6mez, Eleazar L6pez Contreras, and Marcos P6rez Jim6nez;2 0 and now, at the beginning of the
twenty-first century, of Hugo ChAvez Frias, who has unearthed
the name of Bolivar not only in order to change the very name of
the country, but also to serve as the support for a new, but at the
same time very old, political doctrine of Socialism, which was
completely unknown in Bolivar's times.
Professor John Lynch, the most important non-Venezuelan biographer of Bolivar, noted that military rulers using the name of
Bolivar during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, had "at
least more or less respected the basic thought of the Liberator,
even when they misrepresented its meaning."2 1 Nonetheless, referring to the current situation of the Chdvez regime, the same
as a military figure, fighting and commanding the national forces against the Spanish
military invasion of the country in 1812. This is the reason for his name being indissolubly
attached to the Venezuelan Independence, as well as to the independence of other Latin
See ALLAN R. BREWER-CARIAS, LOS INICIOS DEL PROCESO
American countries.
CONSTITUYENTE HISPANO Y AMERICANO. CARACAS 1811 - CADIZ 1812 (2012).
20. See generally ALLAN R. BREWER-CARIAs, HISTORIA CONSTITUCIONAL DE VENEZUELA

(2008).
21. See JOHN LYNCH, SIMON BOLIVAR: A LIFE 304 (2007); see also GERMAN CARRERA
DAMAS, EL CULTO A BOLIVAR, ESBOZO PARA UN ESTUDIO DE LA HISTORIA DE LAS IDEAS EN
VENEZUELA (1969); LuIs CASTRO LEIVA, DE LA PATRIA BOBA A LA TEOLOGiA BOLIVARIANA
(1987); ELiAS PINO ITURRIETA, EL DIVINO BOLIVAR. ENSAYO SOBRE UNA RELIGI6N
REPUBLICANA (2008); ANA TERESA TORRES, LA HERENCIA DE LA TRIBU. DEL MITO DE LA
INDEPENDENCIA A LA REVOLUCION BOLIVARIANA (2009). See also the historiography study
on these books in TOMAS STRAKA, LA lPICA DEL DESENCANTO (2009).
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Professor Lynch concluded his comments on the political use of the
name of Bolivar that:
In 1998 Venezuelans were astonished to learn that their
country had been renamed 'the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela' by decree of President Hugo Chdvez, who called himself
a 'revolutionary Bolivarian.' Authoritarian populist, or
neocaudillos, or Bolivarian militarists, whatever their designation, invoke Bolivar no less ardently than did previous rulers, though it is doubtful whether he would have responded to
their calls.

.

. But the new heresy, far from maintaining conti-

nuity with the constitutional ideas of Bolivar, as was claimed,
invented a new attribute, the populist Bolivar, and in the case
of Cuba gave him a new identity, the socialist Bolivar. By exploiting the authoritarian tendency, which certainly existed in
the thought and action of Bolivar, regimes in Cuba and Venezuela claim the Liberator as patron for their policies, distorting his ideas in the process.22
An effective and novel adherence to Bolivar had led to the
change of the very name of the Republic, and to the invention of a
new "Bolivarian doctrine" in order to justify the government's policies, as the retired Lieutenant General Chdvez has done regarding
what he has called the "Bolivarian Revolution" linked to his idea
of a "twenty-first century Socialism"2 3 implemented under the tutelage of the Cuban dictators. Of course, it is needless to say that
no relation can be found in any of Sim6n Bolivar writings to any
aspect related to "socialism." Note that if Bolivar would have expressed any idea related to socialism, Karl Marx himself would
have commented upon it when he wrote the entry on "Sim6n Bolivar y Ponte" for the New American Cyclopedia published in New
York24 eleven years after publishing his book with Fredrick Engels

22. See LYNCH, supra note 21, at 304; see also A.C. CLARK, THE REVOLUTIONARY HAS
No CLOTHES: HUGO CHAVEz's BOLIVARIAN FARCE 5-14 (2009).

23. The last attempt to completely appropriate Sim6n Bolivar for the "Bolivarian Revolution," was the televised exhumation of his remains that took place at the National Pantheon in Caracas on July 26, 2010, conducted by President Chivez himself and other high
officials, including the Prosecutor General, among other things, for the purpose of determining if Bolivar died of arsenic poisoning in Santa Marta in 1830, instead of from tuberculosis. See Simon Romero, Building a New History By Exhuming Bolivar, N.Y. TIMES, August 4, 2010, at A7.
24. See Bolivary Ponte, Sim6n, in THE NEw AMERICAN CYCLOPAEDIA (1858), available
at http/www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1858/01/bolivar.htm.
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on The German Ideology.2 5 It was in this 1847 book where those
authors used the word "communism" perhaps for the first time; 26
and the fact is that ten years later, in the 1857 article on Bolivar,
Marx made no mention at all regarding any "socialist" ideas of
Bolivar, especially considering that the article, by the way, was
one of, if not the most critical work on Bolivar ever written.
On the other hand, and beside any ideological issues, in all Venezuelan constitutional history, the only "Bolivarian Republic" that
has existed, strictly speaking, has been the State that resulted
from the "union of the peoples of Colombia" proposed by Sim6n
Bolivar in 1819, and materialized in the 1821 Constitution of the
Republic of Colombia (comprising the territories of today's Venezuela, Nueva Granada, and Ecuador). With that constitution, the
Republic of Venezuela disappeared as an autonomous state,2 7 a
situation that endured up to 1830, until Bolivar's death.
Consequently, the renaming of the Republic in 1999 as "Bolivarian Republic," this time fortunately without affecting the country's
sovereignty, can only be explained as an intent to give the Republic, a "definitive" national doctrine supposedly based on the
thoughts of Bolivar, which has been no more that the label used by
the new rulers of the country in order to impose their own socialist
doctrine disguised as a "Bolivarian" one.
To that end, the first step adopted by Chavez was to give the
country the name of Bolivar, initially with an exclusive political or
partisan purpose derived from the name given in 1982 to the political movement used by Chdvez to gain power, which was called
the "Bolivarian Revolutionary Movement 200 (MBR-200)." Because such an organization, once transformed into a formal political party, was not allowed to use the name of Bolivar, 2 8 the decision taken was to incorporate the name of Bolivar in the Constitu-

25. The book was written between 1845 and 1846.
published in February 1848.

The Communist Manifesto was

26. See KARL MARX & FREDERICH ENGELS, The German Ideology, in 5 COLLECTIVE
WORKS
47
(Int.
Pub.
1976),
available
at

http://www.educa.madrid.org/cmstools/files/0a24636f-764c-4e03-9c1d6722e2ee60d7/Texto%2OMarx%20y%2OEngels.pdf.
27. See the texts of all these laws in ALLAN R. BREWER-CARfAS, 1 LAS CONSTITUCIONES
DE VENEZUELA 643-46 (2008).

28. According to the Political Parties Law, GACETA OFICIAL NO. 27.725, Apr. 30, 1965,
political parties cannot use the name of the founders of the country or homeland symbols.
The political organization the president formed before campaigning for the 1998 election
was Movimiento Bolivariano 200. That name could not be used to identify the political
party he founded, which became Movimiento V Repliblica.
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tion of the country.2 9 The party itself became the Fifth Republic
Movement (Movimiento V Repiblica, MVR) that was later transformed into the United Socialist Party of Venezuela (PSUV),
which declared itself as a "Marxist" party following the "Bolivarian doctrine."so
In 1999, I was one of the few members of the 1999 Constituent
Assembly that voted against the country's renaming proposal,"
not only because I considered it was partisan motivated, but also
because I considered that a republic organized as "a federal decentralized State" was essentially anti-"Bolivarian," Bolivar being the
one that in the first decades of Latin American independence
promoted the idea of centralized governments - non-federal - in

the new republics.32 In any case, the new name was given to the
Republic, later linked with socialism as a political doctrine.
The consequence of the 1999 constitutional reform, in any case,
was that everything related to the new political regime was called
"Bolivarian," beginning, for instance, with the creation ten years
ago of the "Bolivarian Circles" that were the first social or communal organizations promoted and supported by the government
in order to react against any opposition to the government and to
threaten anybody with different views.33 This lead to the bitter
polarization of the country between "Bolivarian" and "nonBolivarians" which supposedly led to the polarization, between
patriots and anti-patriots, good people and bad people, pure people
and corrupt people, revolutionary and antirevolutionary or oligarchs; and now between socialists and non-socialists. All that
was accomplished by manipulating history and popular feelings
regarding the image of Bolivar.

29. Mutatis mutandi, in a certain way it happened with the use of the name of Augusto
C. Sandino in the name of the Frente Sandinistade Liberacidn and of the Sandinista Republic of Nicaragua.
30. See "Declaration of Principles" of the United Socialist Party of Venezuela (Apr. 23,
http//www.psuv.org.ve/wpat
available
2010),
content/uploads/2010/06/Declaracionprincipios.pdf.
31. See Allan R. Brewer-Carias, 3 DEBATE CONSTITUYENTE (APORTES A LA ASAMBLEA
NACIONAL CONSTITUYENTE) 237, 251-52.

32. See Allan R. Brewer-Carfas, Ideas centrales sobre la organizacidn el Estado en la
Obra del Libertadory sus Proyecciones Contempordneas, 95-96 BOLETIN DE LA ACADEMIA
DE CIENCIAS POLITICAS Y SOCIALES, 137 (1984).

33. The general assembly of the Organization of American States, in its report of Apr.
18, 2002, said about the Bolivarian Circles, that they "are groups of citizens or grassroots
organizations which support the President's political platform. Many sectors consider them
responsible for the human rights violations, acts of intimidation, and looting." See the
reference in ALLAN R. BREWER-CARIAs, LA CRISIS DE LA DEMOCRACIA EN VENEZUELA (2002).
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In 2007, the constant promotion of the "Bolivarian Revolution,"
led the President of the Republic himself to draft and propose a
constitutional reform before the National Assembly to formally
include in the text of the Constitution, the link between the "Bolivarian doctrine" and socialism as the fundamental doctrine of the
state, even for international relations.
This constitutional reform based on the then so-called "twentyfirst century socialism," failed to be implanted, and was rejected
by the people through popular vote in a referendum that took
place on December 2, 2007." Nonetheless, despite its rejection by
the people's votes, in the following year (2008), the 2007 constitutional reform proposals began to be implemented by the authoritarian government in violation of the Constitution through a massive number of decree laws issued by the President, and by means
of organic laws sanctioned by the National Assembly, "reforming"
in this way the Constitution but without formally reviewing it.
The last set of unconstitutional legislation implementing the 2007
rejected reform was approved in December of 2010, by formally
creating a Communal State (or Socialist or Communist state)
based upon the exercise of a Popular Power without any constitutional basis, in parallel to the existing Constitutional decentralized State based upon the Public Power (National, state, municipal) expressly established in the Constitution."
These laws related to the implantation of Socialism as the doctrine of the new Communal State, were sanctioned in 2010, after
Chdvez confessed himself in January 2010, that the supposedly
"Bolivarian revolution," was no more than the phantasmagoric
resurrection of the historically failed "Marxist revolution," but led
by a president who denied ever reading Marx's writings.3 ' This
public announcement lead to the adoption in April 2010, by the
34. The definitive voting figures in such referendum have never been informed-to the
country by the government-controlled National Electoral Council. See Allan R. BrewerCarfas, Estudio sobre la propuesta de Reforma Constitucional para establecer un estado
socialista, centralizado y militarista (Andlisis del anteproyecto presidencial, Agosto de
2007), 7 CADERNOS DA ESCOLA DE DIREITO E RELAQOES INTERNACIONAIS DA UNIBRASIL 265
(2007).

35. See Gustavo Linares Benzo, S6lo un Poder Ptiblico mis. El Poder Popular en la
reforma del 2007, 112 REVISTA DE DERECHO POTBLICO 102 (2007); Arturo Peraza, Reforma,
Democraciaparticipativay PoderPopular, 112 REVISTA DE DERECHO PllBLICO 107 (2007).
36. In his annual speech before the National Assembly on Jan. 15, 2010, in which Chdvez declared to have "assumed Marxism," he also confessed that he had never read Marx's
works. See Maria Lilibeth Da Corte, Por Primera vez Asumo el Marxismo, EL UNIVERSAL
(Caracas), Jan. 16, 2010, available at http://www.eluniversal.com/2010/01/16/pol-art-porprimera-vez-asu_1726209.shtml.
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governmental United Socialist Party of Venezuela (over which the
President presides), in its First Extraordinary Congress, of a "Declaration of Principles" in which the party was officially declared as
a "Marxist," "Anti-imperialist" and "Anti-capitalist" party. According to the same document, the party's actions are based on "scientific socialism" and on the "inputs of Marxism as a philosophy of
praxis," in order to substitute the "Capitalist Bourgeois State"
with a "Socialist State" based on the Popular Power and the socialization of the means of production.3 7 Of course, none of these ideas
can be found in the works of Sim6n Bolivar, his name is only being
used as a pretext to continue the manipulation of the Bolivar
"cult" in order to justify authoritarianism, which has occurred so
many times before in the history of Venezuela."
With these declarations, it can finally be said that the so called
"Bolivarian Revolution" was unveiled; a revolution for which nobody in Venezuela has voted except for its rejection in the December 2, 2007 referendum, in which the President's proposals for
constitutional reforms in order to establish a Socialist, Centralized, Police and Militaristic state received a negative popular response."
III. THE INTENT TO RADICALLY TRANSFORM THE CONSTITUTIONAL
STATE INTO A SOCIALIST, CENTRALIZED AND COMMUNAL STATE, IN
2007, IN VIOLATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, BY MEANS OF A
"CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM" PROCEDURE THAT WAS REJECTED BY
THE PEOPLE, AND THAT WAs DECLARED BY THE SUPREME TRIBUNAL
OF JUSTICE AS NON-JUSTICIABLE

As aforementioned, a major step taken to formally consolidate
in the Constitution an authoritarian government by establishing a
socialist, centralized and communal state in substitution of the
democratic decentralized social State, was the 2007 constitutional
reform proposal in order to establish a "Popular Power State" or
37. See "Declaraci6n de Principios, I Congreso Extraordinario del Partido Socialista
2010, available at http://www.psuv.org.ve/wpUnido de Venezuela," Apr. 23,
content/uploads/2010/06/Declaracion principios.pdf.
38. See supra notes 21-22.
39. See on the 2007 constitutional reform proposals, ALLAN R. BREWER-CARIAS, HACIA
LA CONSOLIDACION DE uN ESTADO SOCIALISTA, CENTRALIZADO, POLICIAL Y MILITARISTA.
COMENTARIOS SOBRE EL SENTIDO Y ALCANCE DE LAS PROPUESTAS DE REFORMA
CONSTITUCIONAL 2007 (2007); ALLAN R. BREWER-CARIAS, LA REFORMA CONSTITUCIONAL DE
2007 (COMENTARIOS AL PROYECTO INCONSTITUCIONALMENTE SANCIONADO POR LA ASAMBLEA
NACIONAL EL 2 DE NOVIEMBRE DE 2007) (2007).
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"Communal State,"4 0 which was submitted by the president of the
republic before the National Assembly. As mentioned, the reform
was approved by the Assembly, but once submitted to popular
vote, it was rejected by the people on December 2, 2007.
The constitutional reform was intended to radically transform
the most essential and fundamental aspects of the state,4 1 being
one of the most important reforms proposals in all of Venezuelan
constitutional history. With it, the decentralized, democratic, pluralistic, and social state built and consolidated since the Second
World War would have been radically changed to create a socialist, centralized, repressive and militaristic state grounded in the
so-called "Bolivarian doctrine," identified with "2 1 st century socialism" and a socialist economic system of state capitalism. As mentioned, this reform was sanctioned by evading the procedure established in the Constitution for such fundamental change, which
imposed the convening of a Constituent Assembly. In fact, the
reform designed defrauding the Constitution4 2 was one additional
step in the "permanent coup d'6tat" that has occurred in Venezuela since 1999.43
The most important consequence of the proposed reform was the
adoption of an official state ideology and doctrine in Venezuela,
which was the socialist and supposedly "Bolivarian" doctrine.
These principles could have applied if approved by the people to
impose a duty on all citizens to actively contribute to its implementation. This would eliminate any vestige of political plural-

40. See BREWER-CARIAS, supra note 39.
41. See Rogelio Prez Perdomo, La Constitucidn de papel y su reforma, 112 REVISTA DE
DERECHO PJBLICO 14 (2007); Gerardo FernAndez, Aspectos esenciales de la modificaci6n
constitucional propuestapor el Presidente de la Reptiblica. La modificaci6n constitucional
como un fraude a la democracia, 112 REVISTA DE DERECHO P(JBLICO 22 (2007); Alfredo
Arismendi, Utopia Constitucional, 112 REVISTA DE DERECHO PJBLICO 31 (2007); Manuel
Rachadell, El personalismo politico en el Siglo XX, 112 REVISTA DE DERECHO PCTBLIco 66
(2007); Allan R. Brewer-Carias, El sello socialistaque se pretendia imponer al Estado, 112
REVISTA DE DERECHO PJBLICO 71 (2007); Alfredo Morles Hern.ndez, El nuevo modelo
econ6mico parael Socialismo del Siglo XX, 112 REVISTA DE DERECHO PIBLICO 233 (2007).
42. See Perdomo, supra note 41, at 112; FernAndez, supra note 41, at 21-25; GonzAlez,
supra note 41, at 33-36; Lolymar Herdndez Camargo, Los limites del cambio constitucional
como garantiade pervivencia del Estado de derecho, 112 REVISTA DE DERECHO PJBLICO 37
(2007); Claudia Nikken, La soberaniapopular y el trdmite de la refroma constitucional
promovida por iniciativapresidencial el 15 de agosto de 2007, 112 REVISTA DE DERECHO
PUJBLICO 51 (2007).
43. See Jos6 Amando Mejia Betancourt, La rupturadel hilo constitucional, 112 REVISTA
DE DERECHO PfJBLIco 47 (2007). The term was first used by Francois Mitterand in LE
COUP D'ETAT PERMANENT (editions, 1993) (1964).
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ism, and allow for the formal criminalization of any dissidence
regarding the unique and official way of thinking.
Guidelines for the proposed reforms emerged from various discussions and speeches of the president. These pointed out, on the
one hand, to the formation of a state of "popular power" or of
"communal power," or a "communal state" (Estadodel poder popular o del poder communal, o Estado comunal) built upon communal councils (consejos comunales) as primary political units or social organizations. The communal councils, whose members are
not elected by means of universal, direct, and secret suffrage,
which is contrary to the democratic principles established in the
Constitution, were created by statute since 200644 with a status
parallel to the municipal entities, supposedly to channel citizen
participation in public affairs. However, since their creation, they
have operated within a system of centralized management conducted by the national executive power and without any political
or territorial autonomy.45
On the other hand, the guidelines for the proposed constitutional reform also referred to the structuring of a socialist state and
the substitution of the existing system of economic freedom and
mixed economy by a state and collectivist socialist economic system subject to centralized planning, thus minimizing the role of
individuals and eliminating any vestige of economic liberties or
private property as constitutional rights.
These proposals had the purpose of radically transforming the
state by creating a completely new juridical order, a change that
according to Article 347 of the 1999 Constitution, required the
convening and election of a Constituent Assembly and could not be
undertaken by means of mere constitutional reform procedures."
This latter procedure for constitutional reform can only be applied
to "partial revisions of the Constitution and for substitution of one
or several of its provisions without modifying the structure and

44. Ley de Consejos Comunales, GACETA OFICIAL, ExTRA., 5.806, Apr. 10, 2006. This
statute was replaced by Ley Orgdnica de los Consejos Comunales. See GACETA OFICIAL No.
39.335, Dec. 28, 2009.

45. See Allan R. Brewer-Carias, El inicio de la desmunicipalizaci6n en Venezuela: La
organizaci6n del poder popularpara eliminarla descentralizaci6n, la democracia representativa y la participacidna nivel local, in AIDA, REVISTA DE LA ASOCIACION INTERNACIONAL
DE DERECHO ADMINISTRATIVO,
UNIVERSIDAD
NACIONAL AUTONOMA
DE MXICO,
ASOCIACION INTERNACIONAL DE DERECHO ADMINISTRATIVO 49 (2007).
46. CONSTITUTION OF THE BOLIVARIAN REPUBLIC OF VENEZUELA (1999), art. 347.
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fundamental principles of the Constitutional text."4 7 In such case,
the limited constitutional change is achieved through debate and
sanctioning in the National Assembly, followed by approval in
popular referendum.
Nonetheless, ignoring these constitutional provisions, the same
political tactic was repeatedly employed since 1999 by acting
fraudulently with respect to the Constitution. That is, the use of
the existing institutions with the appearance of its adherence to
constitutional form and procedure, in order to proceed, as the Supreme Tribunal had warned, "towards the creation of a new political regime, a new constitutional order, without altering the established legal system."48 This occurred in February, 1999 in the
proposal of a consultative referendum in order to ask the people on
whether to convene a Constituent Assembly when that institution
was not prefigured in the then-existing Constitution of 1961. It
occurred with the December 1999 Decree on the Transitory Regime of the Public Powers, with respect to the 1999 Constitution,
which was never the subject of an approbatory referendum." It
has continued to occur in subsequent years with the progressive
destruction of democracy through the factual elimination of any
effective separation of powers, and the sequestering of successive
public rights and liberties, all supposedly based on legal and constitutional provisions."
In this instance, once again, constitutional provisions were
fraudulently used for ends other than those for which they were
established. The "constitutional reform" procedure was used to
radically transform the state, thus disrupting the civil order of the
47. Antonio Ramirez, An Introduction to Venezuelan Governmental Institutions and
Primary
Legal
Sources,
GLOBALEX
(May
2006),
http//www.nyulawglobal.org/globalex/venezuela.htm.
48. See Allan R. Brewer-Carias, The Decision of the Constitutional Chamber of the
Supreme Tribunal of Justice No. 74 (Jan.25, 2006), 105 REVISTA DE DERECHO PflBLICO 76
passim (2006).
49. See ALLAN R. BREWER-CARIAS, ASAMBLEA CONSTITUYENTE Y ORDENAMIENTO
CONSTITUCIONAL (Academia de Ciencias Politicas y Sociales ed., 1999).
50.

See BREWER-CARIAS, supra note 18.

51. See Allan R. Brewer-Carfas, Constitution-Making Process in Defraudation of the
Constitution and Authoritarian Government in Defraudation of Democracy: The Recent
Venezuelan Experience, paperpresented at the VII International Congress of Constitutional
Law, (Athens, Jun. 2007); Allan R. Brewer-Carfas, El autoritarismoestablecido en fraude a
la Constituci6n y a la democracia y su formalizaci6n en Venezuela mediante la reforma
constitucional.(De c6mo en un pais democrdtico se ha utilizadoel sistema eleccionariopara
minar la democraciay establecer un rigimen autoritariode supuesta 'dictadurade la democracia' que se pretende regularizar mediante la reforma constitucional), in TEMAS
CONSTITUCIONALES. PLANTEAMIENTOS ANTE UNA REFORMA 13-74 (2007).
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social-democratic state to convert the state into a socialist, centralized, repressive, and militarist state in which representative
democracy, republican alternation in office and the concept of decentralized power would have disappeared, with all power instead
concentrated in the decisions of the head of state.5 2 That result
could only be achieved constitutionally through the convening of a
Constituent Assembly, which was avoided.
The consequence was that the various state acts adopted the irregular constitutional review procedure. The presidential initiative, the sanction of the reform by the National Assembly, and the
convening of referendum by the National Electoral Council were
all challenged through judicial review actions of unconstitutionality and actions of amparo, filed before the Constitutional Chamber
of the Supreme Tribunal. The response of the Chamber regarding
the actions filed, being as it is completely controlled by the Government, was to declare the issues as non-justiciable, allowing the
deconstitionalization of the Constitutional State."
The purposes of the approved "constitutional reform" for the
radical transformation of the state and the creation a new juridical order were evidenced, first, from the proposals elaborated by
the president's Council for Constitutional Reform that began to
circulate in June 2007,54 and later, from the final draft filed by the
President before the National Assembly on August 15, 2007," in
which the following concepts were proposed:56
52. As is constitutionally proscribed, and as the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Tribunal of Justice summarized in Decision No. 74 (Jan. 25, 2006), a symbolic case,
it occurred "with the fraudulent use of powers conferred by martial law in Germany under
the Weimar Constitution, forcing the Parliament to concede to the fascist leaders, on the
basis of terms of doubtful legitimacy, plenary constituent powers by conferring an unlimited legislative power." Brewer-Carfas, supra note 48, at 76.
53. On these decisions, see Allan R. Brewer-Carias, El juez constitucional vs. la supremacia constitucional. 0 de c6mo la jurisdiccidn constitucional en Venezuela renunci6 a
controlar la constitucionalidaddel procedimiento seguido para la 'reforma constitucional'
sancionadapor la Asamblea Nacional el 2 de noviembre de 2007, antes de que fuera rechazada por el pueblo en el referendo del 2 de diciembre de 2007, 112 REVISTA DE DERECHO
PO2BLICO 661 (2007).

54. The document circulated in June 2007 under the title Consejo Presidencialpara la
Reforma de la Constituci6n de la Reptiblica Bolivariana de Venezuela, "Modificaciones
propuestas." The complete text was published as PROYECTO DE REFORMA CONSTITUCIONAL.

VERSION ATRIBUIDA AL CONSEJO PRESIDENCIAL PARA LA REFORMA DE LA CONSTITUCION DE
LA REPIJBLICA BOLIVARIANA DE VENEZUELA 146 (Editorial Atenea ed., 2007).
55. The full text was published as PROYECTO DE REFORMA CONSTITUCIONAL.
ELABORADO POR EL CIUDADANO PRESIDENTE DE LA REPIJBLICA BOLIVARIANA DE VENEZUELA,
HUGO CHAvEz FRfAS (Editorial Atenea ed., 2007). The director of the National Electoral
Council, Vicente Diaz, stated on July 16, 2007, "The presidential proposal to reform the
constitutional text modifies fundamental provisions and for that reason it would be necessary to convene a National Assembly to approve them." This council member was consulted
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First, to convert the decentralized federal state into a centralized state of concentrated power, under the illusory guise of a
popular power, which implied the definitive elimination of the federal form of the state." This rendered political participation impossible and consequently, degrading representative democracy.
For such purpose, the reform established a new "popular power"
(poderpopular)", composed by communities (comunidades), each

of which "shall constitute a basic and indivisible spatial nucleus of
the Venezuelan Socialist State, where ordinary citizens will have
the power to construct their own geography and their own history;" which were to be grouped into communes (comunas)."
The main aspect of these reforms was to provide the popular
power "through the constitution of communities, communes, and
the self-government of the cities, by means of the communal councils, workers' councils, peasant councils, student councils, and other entities established by law.""o However, although "the people"
(el pueblo) were designated as the "depositary of sovereignty" to be
"exercised directly through the popular power," it was expressly
stated that the popular power "does not arise from suffrage or
from any election, but arises from the condition of the organized
human groups that form the base of the population."" Consequently, representative democracy at the local level and territorial
political autonomy disappeared, substituted with a supposed paron
this
matter
on
Uni6n
Radio,
Aug.
16,
2007,
available
at
http://www.unionradio.com.ve/Noticias/No-ticia.aspx?noticiaid=212503.
The initiation of
the reform process in the National Assembly could have been challenged before the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Tribunal on the basis of unconstitutionality. Nonetheless, the president of the Constitutional Chamber - who was also a member of the Presidential Council for the Reform of the Constitution - made clear that "no legal action related
to modifications of the constitutional text would be heard until such modifications had been
approved by citizens in referendum," adding that "any action must be presented after a
referendum, when the constitutional reform has become a norm, since we cannot interpret
an attempted norm. Once a draft reform has become a norm we can enter into interpretations of it and hear nullification actions." See Juan Francisco Alonso, EL UNIVERSAL (Caracas), Aug. 18, 2007.
56. On the reform proposals, see the sources cited in supra note 39. Additionally, see
all the articles published in 112 REVISTA DE DERECHO POJBLICO (2007).
57. See Rachadell, supra note 41; Ana Elvira Araujo, Proyecto de reforma constitucional
(agosto a noviembre 2007); Principios fundamentales y descentralizaci6n politica, 112
REVISTA DE DERECHO PJBLICO, 77 (2007); Jos6 Luis Villegas, Impacto de la reforma constitucional sobre las entidades locales, 112 REVISTA DE DERECHO P(IBLICO 119 (2007).
58. Constitutional reform proposal, art. 16.
59. The communes were created in the statute on the Federal Council of Government.
See Ley Orgdnica del Consejo Federal de Gobierno, GACETA OFICIAL No. 5.963 EXTRA., Feb.
22, 2010.
60. ALLEN R. BREWER-CARIAS, DISMANTLING DEMOCRACY IN VENEZUELA 93 (2010).
61. Id.
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ticipatory and protagonist democracy that would, in fact, be controlled by the president and that proscribed any form of political
decentralization and territorial autonomy."
In advance of the constitutional reform proposal, perhaps being
that the government was sure of the support of its approval, the
Law on the Councils of the Popular Power (Consejos del Poder
Popular)was sanctioned in 2006.63 In the same trend of such law,
the reforms proposals conceived "the communes and communities"
(comunas y comunidades) as "the basic and indivisible spatial nucleus of the Venezuelan Socialist State,"6 4 adding that the only
objective of the constitutional provision for political participation
was "for the construction of socialism" requiring that all citizens'
political associations be devoted "to develop the values of mutual
cooperation and socialist solidarity.""
Second, to convert the democratic and pluralist state into a socialist state, with the obligation to "promote people's participation
as a national policy, devolving its power and creating the best
conditions for the construction of a Socialist democracy,"" thus,
establishing a political official doctrine of socialist character-a socalled "Bolivarian doctrine." The consequence of this would have
been that any thoughts differing from the official one were to be
rejected. The official political doctrine was to be incorporated into
the Constitution itself, establishing a constitutional duty for all
citizens to ensure its compliance, imposing the teaching in the
schools of the "idearioBolivariano"(Bolivarian ideology), and stating that the primary investment of the state in education was to
be done "according to the humanistic principles of the Bolivarian
socialism." As a consequence, the basis for criminalizing all dissidence was formally established.
62. This fundamental change, as the president stated on August 15, 2007, constituted
"the development of what we understand by decentralization, because the Fourth Republic
concept of decentralization is very different from the concept we must work with. For this
reason, we have here stated 'the protagonist participation of the people, transferring power
to them, and creating the best conditions for the construction of social democracy.'" Id; see
Discurso de orden pronunciadopor el ciudadano Comandante Hugo Chdvez Frias,op. cit.,
50.
63. See Giancarlo Henriquez Maionica, Los Consejos Comunales (una breve aproximaci6n a su realidady a su proyecci6n ante la propuestapresidencialde reforma constitucional), 112 REVISTA DE DERECHO POBLICO 89 (2007); Brewer-Carias, supra note 48, at 49-67.
The 2006 law was replaced by Ley Orgdnica de los Consejos Comunales, GACETA OFICIAL
No. 39.335, Dec. 28, 2009. See the comments on this law in ALLAN R. BREWER-CARIAS, LEY
DE LOS CONSEJOS COMUNALES (Editorial Juridica Venezolana ed., 2010).
64. Constitutional reform proposal, art. 15.
65. Id. at art. 70.
66. Id. at art. 158.
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Third, to convert the mixed economic system into a state-owned,
socialist, centralized economy by means of eliminating economic
liberty and private initiative as constitutional rights, as well as
the constitutional right to private property; conferring the means
of production to the state, to be centrally managed; and configuring the state as an institution on which all economic activity depended and to whose bureaucracy the totality of the population is
subject. In this sense, the reform established that the socialist
economic model created was to achieve "the best conditions for the
collective and cooperative construction of a Socialist Economy,"
through "socialist means of production"" by constituting "mixed
corporations and/or socialist units of production,"" or "economic
units of social production" as to "create the best conditions for the
collective and cooperative construction of a socialist economy," or
"different forms of businesses and economic units from social
property, both directly or communally, as well as indirectly or
through the state."" The reforms sought simply to derogate and
eliminate the right to the free exercise of economic activities as a
constitutional right and economic freedom itself." The reforms
then referred to the "socialist principles of the socioeconomic system"7 2 and to the "socialist state" and the "socialist development of
the nation."" All the reforms collided with the ideas of liberty and
solidarity proclaimed in the 1999 Constitution and established a
state that substitutes itself for society and private economic initiative.
Fourth, to convert the liberal state into a repressive (i.e., police)
state, given the regressive character of the regulations established
in the reform regarding human rights, particularly civil rights,
and the expansion of the president's emergency powers, under
which he was authorized to suspend constitutional rights indefinitely.
67. Id. at art. 112.
68. Id. at art. 168.
69. Id. at art. 113.
70. Id. at art. 112.
71. See Ferndndez, supra note 41, at 24; Arismendi, supra note 41, at 31; Jos6 Antonio
Muci Borijas, La suerte de la libertadecon6mica en el proyecto de Reforma de la Constituci6n
de 2007, 112 REVISTA DE DERECHO PJBLICO 203 (2007); Tamara AdriAn, Actividad econ6mica y sistemas alternativos de producci6n, 112 REVISTA DE DERECHO PIBLIcO 209 (2007);
Victor Hernindez Mendible, Rdquiem por la libertad de empresa y derecho de propiedad,
112 REVISTA DE DERECHO PUBLICO 215 (2007) ; HernAndez, supranote 41, at 233-36.
72. Constitutional reform proposal, art. 299.
73. Id. at arts. 318, 320.
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Fifth, and finally, to convert the civil state into a militarist
state, on the basis of the role assigned to the "Bolivarian Armed
Force" (Fuerza Armada Bolivariana), which was configured to
function wholly under the president, and the creation of the new
"Bolivarian National Militia (Milicia Nacional Bolivariana). All
were to act "by means of the study, planning and execution of Bolivarian military doctrine"-that is, according to socialist doctrine.
All the reforms implied the radical transformation of the Venezuelan political system sought to establish a centralized socialist,
repressive and militaristic state of popular power and departed
fundamentally from the concept of a civil social-democratic state
under the rule of law and justice based on a mixed economy. None
of those reforms could be achieved through a "constitutional reform" procedure.
The motives for the reforms were all very explicitly expressed by
the president of the republic in 2007, beginning with his speech of
presentation of the draft reforms before the National Assembly.
In that speech, he said that the reforms' main objective was "the
construction of a Bolivarian and socialist Venezuela"-that is, to
sow "socialism in the political and economic realms."7 4 He clearly
expressed that in his presidential campaign in 1999, he did not
propose such thing as "projecting the road of socialism" to be incorporated in the Constitution. In contrast to that claim, as candidate for reelection in 2006, he said: "Let us go to Socialism," deducing from that "everyone who voted for [reelecting] candidate
ChAvez then, voted to go to socialism.""
This was then the motivation for the drafting of the constitutional reforms in 2007, aiming to construct "Bolivarian Socialism,
Venezuelan Socialism, our Socialism, and our socialist model,"
having "the community" (la comunidad) as a "basic and indivisible
nucleus," and considering that "real democracy is only possible in
socialism." However, the democracy referred to was not at all a
representative democracy because it was "not born of suffrage or
74. See Discurso de orden pronunciado por el ciudadano Comandante Hugo Chdvez
Frias,Presidente Constitucionalde la Repdblica Bolivarianade Venezuela en la conmemoracidn del ducenticimo segundo aniversariodel juramento del LibertadorSim6n Bolivar en
el Monte Sacro y el tercer aniversario del referendo aprobatoriode su mandato constitucional, special session, Aug. 15, 2007, Asamblea Nacional, Divisi6n de Servicio y Atenci6n
legislativa, Secci6n de Edici6n, Caracas 2007, 4, 33.
75. Id. at 4. That is, it sought to impose the wishes of only 46% of registered voters
who voted to reelect the president on the remaining 56% of registered voters who did not
vote for presidential reelection. According to official statistics from the National Electoral
Council, of 15,784,777 registered voters, only 7,309,080 voted to reelect the president.
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from any election, but rather is born from the condition of organized human groups as the base of the population.""
The president in that speech summarized the aims of his reform
proposals explaining that on the political ground, the purpose was
to "deepen popular Bolivarian democracy" and, on the economic
ground, to "create better conditions to sow and construct a socialist productive economic model," which he considered "our model."
That is, "in the political field: socialist democracy; on the economic, the productive socialist model; in the field of public administration, incorporate new forms in order to lighten the load, to leave
behind bureaucracy, corruption, and administrative inefficiency,
which are heavy burdens of the past still upon us like weights, in
the political, economic and social areas.""
All his proposals to construct socialism were linked by the president to Sim6n Bolivar's 1819 Constitution of Angostura, which he
considered "perfectly applicable to a socialist project" in the sense
of considering that it was possible to "take the original Bolivarian
ideology as a basic element of a socialist project."" Of course, this
assertion had no serious foundations: it is enough to read Bolivar's
1819 Angostura discourse on presenting the draft constitution to
realize that it has nothing to do with a "socialist project" of any
kind. 9
The rejected constitutional reform, without doubt, would have
altered the basic foundations of the state.8 0 This is true particularly with respect to the proposals on the constitutional amplifica76. See Hugo Chdvez, Discurso de orden pronunciado por el ciudadano Comandante
Hugo Chdvez Frias, op cit., 32, 34, 35 (Aug. 15, 2007).
77. Id. at 74.
78. Id. at 42. Only one month before the president's speech on the proposed constitutional reforms, the former minister of defense, General in Chief Ratil Baduel, who was in
office until July 18, 2007, stated on leaving the Ministry of Popular Power for the Defense
that the president's call to "construct socialism for the twenty-first century, implied a necessary, pressing and urgent need to formalize a model of Socialism that is theoretically its
own, autochthonous, in accord with our historical, social, political and cultural context." He
added, "Until this moment, this theoretical model does not exist and has not been formulated." See the reference in Brewer-Carfas, supra note 17, at 272. It is hard to imagine that it
could have been formulated just one month later.
79. See SIMON BOLIVAR, ESCRITOS FUNDAMENTALES (German Carrera Damas ed.,
1982); see also SIMON BOLIVAR, EL LIBERTADOR Y LA CONSTITUCION DE ANGOSTURA DE 1819

(Pedro Grases ed., Banco Hipotecario de Credito Urbano) (1970); ACTAS DEL CONGRESO DE
ANGOSTURA, (Josd Rodriguez Iturbe ed.) (1969). The contrary at least would have been
noticed by Karl Mark who, on the contrary, in 1857 wrote a very critical entry regarding
Bolivar, without discovering any socialist trends in his life, in Bolivar y Ponte, Sim6n. See
CYCLOPAEDIA, supra note 24.
80. See Eugenio Herndndez Bret6n, Cuando no hay miedo (ante la Reforma Constitucional), 112 REVISTA DE DERECHO PJBLICO 17 (2007); Rachadell, supra note 41, at 65-70.
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tion of the so-called Bolivarian doctrine; the substitution of the
democratic, social state with the socialist state; the elimination of
decentralization as a policy of the state designed to develop public
political participation; and the elimination of economic freedom
and the right to property."' All these constitutional reforms, approved by the National Assembly through defrauding of the Constitution, as aforementioned, were submitted to popular vote, and
were all rejected by the people in the referendum that took place
on December 2, 2007.82

Of course, as mentioned, none of these radical reforms of the
State could be achieved through the constitutional review procedure ("constitutional reform") used by the President and the National Assembly. Major constitutional changes as those proposed
in 2007 can only be approved by means of the convening of a Constituent Assembly.
That is why the unconstitutional procedure that was followed
for the reform, as mentioned, was of course challenged as unconstitutional before the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Tribunal of Justice. That body, however, was completely controlled
by the Executive and refused to exercise judicial review on these
matters, declaring that such actions could not even be filed
("improponible").83

Nonetheless, as aforementioned, through the December 2, 2007
referendum, the proposed constitutional reform was rejected by
popular vote,84 which did not prevent the authoritarian government to proceed to implement the new system ignoring such popular vote, through ordinary legislation and through constitutional
interpretations.

81. See Brewer-Carfas, supra note 17 (discussing these reforms).
82. See Allan R. Brewer-Carias, La proyectada reforma constitucional de 2007, rechazada por el poder constituyente originario, in ANUARIO DE DERECHO PlBLICO 2007 17
(2008). According to information from the National Electoral Council on Dec. 2, 2007, of
16,109,664 registered voters, only 9,002,439 voted (44.11% abstention); of voters, 4,504,354
rejected the proposal (50.70%). This means that there were only 4,379,392 votes to approve
the proposal (49.29%), so only 28% of registered voters voted for the approval.
83. See Brewer-Carias, supra note 53, at 385-435.
84. See Brewer-Carfas, supra note 82, at 17-65. According to information from the
National Electoral Council on Dec. 2, 2007, of 16,109,664 registered voters, only 9,002,439
voted (44.11% abstention); of voters, 4,504,354 rejected the proposal (50.70%). This means
that there were only 4,379,392 votes to approve the proposal (49.29%), so only 28% of registered voters voted for the approval.
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IV. THE FRAUDULENT IMPLEMENTATION OF THE REJECTED 2007
CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM

In effect, the formal popular rejection of the 2007 constitutional
reforms proposals through the December, 2007 referendum, which
in any democratic state would have lead the government to listen
and follow the will of the people, meant nothing to the president of
the republic and to the president and other main officials of the
National Assembly from beginning to implement the reforms in
order to establish the socialist state. This effort was undertaken
without even bothering to try again to formally change the Constitution.
This has been achieved during the past five years, first through
the progressive political process of concentrating and controlling
all public powers by the national executive, through the National
Assembly, as has occurred regarding the Judiciary; second,
through the enactment of ordinary legislation by the National Assembly, and decrees laws issued by the president of the republic as
delegate legislation," which the Supreme Tribunal has refused to
control; third, through the implementation of a nationalization,
expropriation and confiscation process of private industries, private assets and private properties;" and fourth, through constitutional "mutations," that is, changes introduced in the Constitution
85. See Allan R. Brewer-Carfas, La justicia sometida al poder /La ausencia de independencia y autonomia de los jueces en Venezuela por la interminable emergencia del Poder
Judicial (1999-2006)], in CUESTIONES INTERNACIONALES. ANUARIO JURIDICO VILLANUEVA
2007 25-57 (2007).
86. See Lolymar HernAndez Camargo, Limites del poder ejecutivo en el ejercicio de la
habilitaci6nlegislativa:Imposibilidad de establecer el contenido de la reforma constitucional rechazada via habilitaci6n legislativa, 115 REVISTA DE DERECHO PITBLICO 51 passim
(2008); Jorge Kiriakidis, Breves reflexiones en torno a los 26 Decretos-Ley de julio-agostode
2008, y la consulta popular refrendariade diciembre de 2007, 115 REVISTA DE DERECHO
PitBLICO 57 passim (2008); Jos6 Vicente Haro Garcia, Los recientes intentos de reforma
constitucional o de c6mo se estd tratando de estableceruna dictadurasocialista con apariencia de legalidad(A propdsito del proyecto de reforma constitucionalde 2007 y los 26 decretos
leyes del 31 de julio de 2008 que tratan de imponerla), 115 REVISTA DE DERECHO PITBLICO
63 (2008); Ana Cristina Nufiez Machado, Los 26 nuevos Decretos-Leyes y los principios que
regulan la intervenci6n del Estado en la actividad econ6mica de los particulares, 115
REVISTA DE DERECHO P(JBLICO 215 (2008); Aurilivi Linares Martinez, Notas sobre el uso del
poder de legislarpor decreto porparte del Presidentevenezolano, 115 REVISTA DE DERECHO
PUBLIco 79 (2008); Carlos Luis Carrillo Artiles, La parad6jicasituaci6n de los Decretos
Leyes Orgdnicos frente a la Ingenieria Constitucional de 1999, 115 REVISTA DE DERECHO
PlJBLICO 93 (2008); Freddy J. Orlando S., El "paquetazo," un conjunto de leyes que conculcan derechos y amparan injusticias, 115 REVISTA DE DERECHO PJBLICO 101 (2008).
87. See ANTONIO CANOVA GONZALEZ, LUIS ALFONSO HERRERA ORELLANA, AND KARINA
ANZOLA SPADARO, 1EXPROPIACIONES 0 VIAS DE HECHO? LA DEGRADACION CONTINUADA DEL
DERECHO FUNDAMENTAL DE PROPIEDAD EN LA VENEZUELA ACTUAL (2009).
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by means of interpretation made by the Constitutional Chamber
of the Supreme Tribunal of Justice as Constitutional Jurisdiction."
The result has been that absolutely all the mentioned general
trends and basic purposes of the popularly rejected 2007 constitutional reform draft have been implemented in the country in contempt of the Constitution, and in view of the entire democratic
world.
This occurred, first, by means of decree laws issued by the president in execution of the February 2007 enabling law" (legislative
delegation) sanctioned by the National Assembly as was proposed
by the president at the beginning of 2007, with the idea of advancing in the proposals for the constitutional reform submitted to the
National Assembly later that year. As aforementioned, perhaps
assuming that such presidential constitutional-reform proposal
was going to be approved by the people, the president began to
implement it in advance through decree laws, and continue to do
so even after the popular rejection of the reforms." This happened
particularly in economic and social matters, beginning the structuring of the socialist centralized state," in a process of delegate
legislation developed in absolute secrecy with no public consultation or participation, in violation of Article 210 of the Constitution.9 2
As aforementioned, the process began even before the draft reforms were even submitted to the National Assembly, when Decree Law No. 5,841 was enacted on June 12, 2007,93 containing the
organic law creating the Central Planning Commission. This was

88. See Allan R. Brewer-Carias, El juez constitucionalal servicio del autoritarismoy la
ilegitima mutaci6n de la Constituci6n: el caso de la Sala Constitucional del Tribunal Supremo de Justicia de Venezuela (1999-2009), 180 REVISTA DE ADMINISTRACI6N PUBLICA 383
(2009); Allan R. Brewer-Carfas, La fraudulenta mutacidn de la Constituci6n en Venezuela, o
de c6mo el juez constitucional usurpa el poder constituyente originario, in ANUARIO DE
DERECHO POJBLICO 23-65 (2009); Jos6 Vicente Haro, La mutacidn de la Constitucidn "Bolivariana", 1 LOS RETOS DEL DERECHO PROCESAL CONSTITUCIONAL EN LATINOAMRICA, I
CONGRESO INTERNACIONAL DE DERECHO PROCESAL CONSTITUCIONAL, 19 Y 20 OCTUBRE DE
201193 (2011).
89. GACETA OFICLM. No. 38.617, Feb. 1, 2007.
90. See Camargo, supra note 86, at 51passim; Kiriakidis, supra note 86, at 57 passim;
Garcia, supra note 86, at 63passim.
91. See Machado, supra note 86, at 215-20.
92. See Martinez, supra note 86, at 79-89; Artiles, supra note 86, at 93-100; Orlando,
supra note 86, at 101-04.
93. GACETA OFICIAL No. 5.841, ExTRA., June 22, 2007.
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the first formal state act devoted to build the socialist state. 94
Once the 2007 constitutional reform was rejected in referendum, a
few days later, on December 13, 2007, the National Assembly approved the 2007-13 Economic and Social Development National
Plan, established in Article 32 of the Decree Law enacting the
Planning Organic Law," in which the basis of the "planning, production and distribution system oriented towards socialism" was
established, providing that "the relevant matter is the progressive
development of social property of the production means."
For such purpose, the proposed 2007 rejected constitutional reforms to assign the state all powers over farming, livestock, fishing and aquaculture, and in particular the production of food were
then materialized in the Decree Law on the Organic Law on
Farming and Food Security and Sovereignty." That law assigned
to the state power not only to authorize food imports but also to
prioritize production and directly assume distribution and commercialization. The law also expanded expropriation powers of
the executive violating the constitutional guarantee of the previous declaration of a specific public interest or public utility involved, and allowing the State occupation of industries without
compensation," what has repeatedly occurred during the past
years."
Another Decree Law, No. 6,130 of June 3, 2008, enacted the
Popular Economy Promotion and Development Law, establishing
a "socio-productive communal model," with different socio94. See Allan R. Brewer-Carias, Comentarios sobre la inconstitucional creacidn de la
Comisi6n Central de Planificaci6n, centralizaday obligatoria, 110 REvISTA DE DERECHO
POBLICO 79 (2007); Luis A. Herrera Orellana, Los Decretos-Leyes de 30 de julio de 2008 y la
Comisi6n Central de Planificaci6n:Instrumentos para la progresiva abolici6n del sistema
politico y del sistema econdmico previstos en la Constituci6n de 1999, 115 REVISTA DE
DERECHO PfOBLIco 221 (2008)

95. GACETA OFICIAL No. 5.554, Nov. 13, 2001.
96. GACETA OFICIAL No. 5.889, EXTRA., July 31, 2008; see Jos6 Ignacio Herndndez G.,
Planificaci6ny soberaniaalimentaria,115 REVISTA DE DERECHO PJBLICO 389 (2008); Juan
Domingo Alfonso Paradisi, La constitucidn econ6mica establecida en la Constituci6n de
1999, el sistema de economia social de mercado y el decreto 6.071 con rango, valor y fuerza
de Ley Orgdnica de seguridad y soberania agroalimentaria,115 REVISTA DE DERECHO
POBLICO 395 (2008); Gustavo A. Grau Fortoul, La participaciandel sector privado en la
producci6n de alimentos, como elemento esencial parapoder alcanzarla seguridadalimentaria (Aproximaci6nal tratamientode la cuesti6n, tanto en la Constituci6n de 1999 como en
la novisima Ley Orgdnicade soberaniay seguridadalimentaria), 115 REVISTA DE DERECHO
PfJBLICO 417 (2008).
97. See Carlos Garcia Soto, Notas sobre la expansi6n del JAbito de la declaratoria de
utilidad piblica o interds social en la expropiaci6n," 115 REVISTA DE DERECHO POBLICO 149,
149-51 (2008).
98.

See, GONZALEZ ET AL., supra note 87.
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productive organizations following the "socialist model."" In the
same openly socialist orientation, Decree Law No. 6,092 was also
issued enacting the Access to Goods and Services Persons Defense
Law,oo which derogated the previous Consumer and Users Protection Law,' with the purpose of regulating all commercialization
and different economic aspects of goods and services, extending
the state powers of control to the point of establishing the possibility of confiscating goods and services by means of their takeover
and occupation of private industries and services through administrative decisions,102 which has also repeatedly occurred during
the past years. 0 s
Regarding the 2007 rejected constitutional reforms related to
eliminating local-level representative democracy, as aforementioned, the same began to be implemented in 2006, even before its
formal proposal, with the sanctioning of the Communal Councils
Law, which created them as social units and organizations not
directed by popularly elected officials, without any sort of territorial autonomy, supposedly devoted to channeling citizens' participation but in a centralized conducted system from the apex of the
national executive.o This law was later reformed and elevated to
organic law rank in 2009.105
99. GACETA OFICIAL No. 5.890, EXTRA., July 31, 2008; see Jesus Maria Alvarado Andrade, La desaparici6n del bolivar como moneda de curso legal (Notas criticas al
inconstitucional Decreto No 6.130, con rango, valor y fuerza de la ley para el fomento y
desarrollo de la economia comunal, de fecha 3 de junio de 2008, 115 REVISTA DE DERECHO
POTBLICO 313 (2008).
100. GACETA OFICIAL No. 5.889, EXTRA., July 31, 2008; Josd Gregorio Silva, Disposiciones sobre el Decreto-Ley para la defensa de las personas en el acceso a bienes y servicios, 115
REVISTA DE DERECHO PUBLICO 277 (2008); Carlos Sim6n Bello Rengifo, Decreto N' 6.092
con rango, valor y fuerza de la ley para la defensa de las personas en el acceso a los
bienes y servicios (Referencias a problemas de imputaci6n), 115 REVISTA DE DERECHO
POBLIco 281 (2008); HernAndez, supra note 41, at 229-32 (2008).
101. GACETA OFICIAL No. 37.930, May 4, 2004.
102. See Juan Domingo Alfonso Paradisi, Comentarios en cuanto a los procedimientos
administrativosestablecidosen el Decreto No 6.092 con rango, valor y fuerza de Ley para la
defensa de las personas en el acceso a los bienes y servicios, 115 REVISTA DE DERECHO
POIBLICO 245 (2008); Karina Anzola Spadaro, El cardcter aut6nomo de las 'medidas
preventivas' contempladas en el articulo 111 del Decreto-Ley para la defensa de las
personas en el acceso a los bienes y servicios, 115 REVISTA DE DERECHO PBLICo 271
(2008).
103. See generally GONZALEZ, ET AL., supra note 87.
104. Ley Orgdnica de los Consejos Comunales, GAZETA OFICLAL NO. 39.335, Dec. 28,
2009. See Juan M. Raffali A., Limites constitucionales de la ContraloriaSocial Popular,
115 REVISTA DE DERECHO POBLICO 133 (2008).
105. See GACETA OFICIAL No. 39.335, Dec. 28, 2009. See Decision No. 1.676, 12-03-2009
Constitutional Chamber, Supreme Tribunal of Justice about the constitutionality of the
organic character of the Communal
Councils Organic Law, available at
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A primary purpose of the 2007 constitutional reforms was to
complete the dismantling of the federal form of the state by centralizing power attributions of the states, creating administrative
entities to be established and directed by the national executive,
attributing powers to the president to interfere in regional and
local affairs, and voiding state and municipal competency by
means of compulsory transfer of that competency to communal
councils.oe The implementation of the rejected constitutional reforms regarding the organization of the "Popular Power" based on
the strengthening of the communes and communal councils was
completed with the approval in 2010 of the Law on the Federal
Council of Government.1 0 7
To implement these reforms, several steps were taken. The
states and municipalities were forced to transfer their attributions
to local institutions controlled by the central power (communal
councils). Further, Decree Law No. 6217 of July 15, 2008, on the
Organic Law of Public Administration that is directly applicable to
the States' and Municipalities' Public Administrations was passed,
in which the National Executive implemented the principle of centralized planning, subjecting regional and local authorities to the
Central Planning Commission."0 o This Organic Law also assigns
to the president, as proposed in the 2007 reforms, the power to
appoint regional authorities with powers to plan, execute, follow
up on and control land use and territorial development policies,
thus subjecting all programs and projects to central planning approval.
Regarding the vertical distribution of state attributions between
the national level and the states, one of the general purposes of
the rejected 2007 constitutional reform was to change the federal
http://www.tsj.gov.ve/decisiones/scon/diciembre/1676-31209-2009-09-1369.html. See ALLAN
R. BREWER-CARIAS, LEY ORGANICA DE LOS CONSEJOS COMUNALES (2010).
106. See Manuel Rachadell, La centralizaci6ndel poder en el Estado federal descentralizado, 115 REVISTA DE DERECHO PlJBLICO 111, 113 (2008).
107. See Ley Orgdnica del Consejo Federal de Gobierno, GACETA OFICIAL No. 5.963,
EXTRA., Feb. 22, 2010.
108. GACETA OFICIAL No. 5.890, ExTRA., July 31, 2008; see Allan R. Brewer-Carias, El
sentido de la reforma de la Ley Orgdnica de la Administraci6n Pziblica, 115 REVISTA DE
DERECHO PGJBLICO 155 (2008); Cosimina G. Pellegrino Pacera, La reedici6n de la propuesta
constitucionalde 2007 en el Decreto No 6.217, con Rango, Valory Fuerza de Ley Orgdnica de
la Administraci6n Pdblica, 115 REVISTA DE DERECHO PlBLICO 163 (2008); Jesus Caballero
Ortiz, Algunos comentarios sobre la descentralizaci6nfuncional en la nueva Ley Orgdnica
de la Administraci6nPdblica, 115 REVISTA DE DERECHO PfJBLICO 169 (2008); Alberto Blanco-Uribe Quintero, Afrenta a la Debida Dignidadfrente a la Administraci6n Piblica. Los
Decretos 6.217 y 6.265, 115 REVISTA DE DERECHO P0IBLICO 175 (2008).
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form of the state and the territorial distribution of the competencies established in Articles 156 and 164 of the Constitution. This
process centralizes the state even further by concentrating almost
all competencies of the public power at the national level.'0 9 Particularly, it "nationalized" the competency set forth in Article
164.10 of the Constitution, which attributed to the states exclusive
jurisdiction on the conservation, administration, and use of national highways, roads, ports and airports. 110
Despite the rejection of the constitutional reforms in the December 2007 referendum, in order to change such provision, the
Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Tribunal, in Decision No.
565 (April 15, 2008), issued an abstract constitutional interpretation at the request of the attorney general of the republic, modifying the content of the constitutional provision, and arguing that
the "exclusive" attribution "was not exclusive" but "concurrent"meaning that the national government could also exercise that
competency interfering with the states' powers."' With that interpretation, the Chamber illegitimately modified the Constitution, usurping popular sovereignty, and changed the federal form
of the state by misrepresenting the territorial distribution system
of powers between the national power and the states. 112 The
Chamber, consequently, urged the National Assembly to issue legislation against the provisions of the 1999 Constitution, which was
effectively accomplished in May 2009 by reforming the Organic
Law on Decentralization, Delimitation, and Transfer of Public Attributions," eliminating the aforementioned exclusive attribution
of the states." 4

109.

See Allan R. Brewer-Carfas & Jan Kleinheisterkamp, Unification of Laws in Feder-

al Systems. National Report on Venezuela, in FEDERALISM AND LEGAL UNIFICATION: A
COMPARATIVE EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATION OF TWENTY SYSTEMS 378-91 (Daniel Halberstam,

Mathias Reimann & Jorge A. Sncherz Cordero eds.) (2012).
110. See Brewer-Carias,supra note 39, at 57; Brewer-Carias, supra note 56, at 24.
111. See Decision No. 565 of the Constitutional Chamber (Apr. 15, 2008), Case: Procurador General de la Repdblica, Interpretaciandel articulo 164.10 de la Constituci6n, available
at httpJ/www.tsj.gov.ve/decisiones/scon/Abril/565-150408-07-1108.htm.
112. See Decision No. 565 of the Constitutional Chamber (Apr. 15, 2008), Case: Procurador General de la Repdblica, Interpretaci6ndel articulo 164.10 de la Constituci6n, available
at http//www.tsj.gov.ve/decisio-nes/scon/Abril/565-150408-07-1108.htm.
113. GACETA OFICIAL No. 39.140, Mar. 17, 2009; see Decision No. 565 of the Constitutional Chamber (Apr. 15, 2008), Case: ProcuradorGeneral de la Repdblica, Interpretaci6ndel
articulo 164.10 de la Constituci6n, available at http//www.tsj.gov.ve/decisiones/scon/Abril/565-150408-07-1108.htm.
114. See Allan R. Brewer-Carias, La Sala Constitucional como poder constituyente: La
modiflcaci6n de la forma federal del estado y del sistema constitucional de divisidn territo-
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The rejected 2007 constitutional reforms also sought to eliminate the Capital District that the 1999 Constitution had created
as a political entity in substitution of the former Federal District,
which was dependent on the national level of government. Notwithstanding popular rejection of the 2007 reform proposals, in
April 2009, such reform was unconstitutionally implemented by
the National Assembly, defrauding once more the Constitution by
sanctioning the Special Law on the Organization and Regime of
the Capital District."' In it, instead of organizing a democratic
political entity to govern the capital district in Caracas, the capital
of the Republic, the law established an organization completely
dependent on the national level of government in the same territorial jurisdiction that "used to be one of the extinct Federal District."" 6 According to this law, the capital district, contrary to
what is provided for in the Constitution, has no elected authorities
of government, and is governed at the national level by means of a
"special regime" consisting of the exercise of the legislative function by the National Assembly itself and a chief of government as
the executive branch appointed by the president." 7 This means
that through a national statute, in the same territory of Caracas,
a new national structure has been unconstitutionally imposed.
Finally, the rejected 2007 proposed constitutional reforms
sought to transform the military and the armed force into the Bolivarian Armed Force organized for the purpose of reinforcing socialism. Those radical changes have nonetheless been implemented by the president, also usurping the constituent power, by
means of a Decree Law reforming the Organic Law on the Armed
Force,"s creating the "Bolivarian National Armed Force" subjected
to a "military Bolivarian Doctrine," and creating in it the "National Bolivarian Militia"-all of this according to what was proposed
and rejected by the people in the 2007 Constitutional Reform.'
rialdel poderptiblico, 114 REVISTA DE DERECHO PCTBLICO 247, 247 (2008); Rachadell, supra
note 106, at 120.
115. GACETA OFICIAL No. 39.156, Apr. 13, 2009. See the comments on this law in ALLAN
R. BREWER-CARIAS ET AL., LEYES SOBRE EL DISTRITO CAPITAL Y EL AREA METROPOLITANA
DE CARACAS (2009).
116. Id.
117. Special Law on the Organization and Regime of the Capital District, supra note
115, art. 3.
118. Decree Law No. 6.239, on the Organic Law of the National Bolivarian Armed Force,
in GACETA OFICIAL No. 5.933, EXTRA., Oct. 21, 2009.
119. See Alfredo Arismendi A., Fuerza Armada Nacional: Antecedentes, evolucidn y
rigimen actual, 115 REVISTA DE DERECHO PUBLICO 187, 198-99 (2008); Jestis Maria Alvarado Andrade, La nueva Fuerza Armada Bolivariana (Comentarios a raiz del Decreto N'
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Almost all these laws and decree laws have been challenged on
grounds of their unconstitutionality before the Constitutional
Chamber of the Supreme Tribunal, which has never issued decision on the matters. Its inaction has been, without doubt, the
main source of the deconstitutionalization of the Constitutional
State.
V. THE CONCLUSION OF THE DECONSTITUTIONALIZATION
PROCESS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL STATE: THE CREATION OF THE
COMMUNAL STATE OF THE POPULAR POWER THROUGH ORDINARILY
LEGISLATION IN 2012
In September 26, 2010 a parliamentary election was held in the
country, the result of which was that the opposition to the government won the popular vote, although not the majority of seats
in the National Assembly, due to distorting electoral regulations.
This result meant, in fact, that the majority of popular vote expressed was against the proposals debated in the electoral campaign for the establishment of a socialist state in Venezuela, a
matter that the president and the governmental majority of the
National Assembly, with a massive campaign for their candidates,
posed as a sort of "plebiscite" on the president, his performance
and his socialist policies.
In disdain of the popular will expressed in the parliamentary
elections ratifying the previous rejection by the people of the reforms in the 2007 referendum, the president and his party, having
lost the absolute control they had since 2005 over the National
Assembly, before the newly elected deputies to the Assembly could
have taken possession of office in January 2011, in late December
2010 forced the National Assembly to proceed to sanction a set of
organic laws. Those laws finished defining the legislative framework for a new state, different to the Constitutional State. In this
way, by-passing the Constitution and in parallel to the Constitutional State, the National Assembly regulated a socialist, centralized, military and police State, called the "Communal State" or the
State of "Popular Power," already rejected by the people in the
referendum of December 2007.
The organic laws that were approved on December 21, 2010 are
the laws on the Popular Power; the Communes; the Communal
6.239, con rango, valor y fuerza de Ley Orgdnica de la FuerzaArmada Nacional Bolivariana), 115 REVISTA DE DERECHO PITBLICO 207 (2008).
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Economic System; the Public and Communal Planning; and the
Social Comptrollership.120 Furthermore, in the same framework of
organizing the "Communal State" based on the "Popular Power,"
the reform of the Organic Law of Municipal Public Power and the
Public Policy Planning and Coordination of the State Councils,1 2 1
and of the Local Council Public Planning Laws stand out.
The delegitimized National Assembly also passed an enabling
law authorizing the president, through delegated legislation, to
enact laws on all imaginable subjects, including laws of organic
nature, emptying the new National Assembly of matters on which
to legislate for a period of eighteen months until June 2012.
All these laws were also challenged on grounds of their unconstitutionality before the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme
Tribunal, 122 which, once again, never issued any decisions pertaining to these matters. As aforementioned, the Tribunal's inaction
has been, without doubt, the main source of the
deconstitutionalization of the Constitutional State.
The general defining framework of the Socialist State imposed
on Venezuelans through such unconstitutional legislation, and for
which nobody has voted, is supposedly based on the exercise of the
sovereignty of the people but exclusively in a "direct" manner
through the exercise of the Popular Power and the establishment
of a Communal State. This is provided in the Organic Law for
Popular Power, which is to be applied to everyone and everything
as an essential part of the new "socialist principle of legality" in
the creation, implementation and control of public management.123
The main purpose of these laws is the organization of the
"Communal State" which has the commune as its fundamental
unit, supplanting in an unconstitutional way the municipalities as
120. See GACETA OFICIAL No. 6.011, EXTRA., Dec. 21, 2010. The Constitutional Chamber
through decision No. 1329 (Dec. 16, 2010), among others, declared the constitutionality of
See
of
these
Laws.
organic
character
the
See
http://www.tsj.gov.ve/decisiones/scon/Diciembre/%201328-161210-2010-10-1437.html.
on all these organic laws, ALLAN R. BREWER-CARIAS, ET AL., LEYES ORGANICAS SOBRE EL
PODER POPULAR YEL ESTADO COMUNAL (2011).
121. See GACETA OFICIAL No. 6.015, EXTRA., Dec. 28, 2010.
122. See Jos6 Ignacio Herndndez, Jesis Maria Alvarado Andrade, & Luis A Herrera
Orellana, Sobre los vicios de inconstitucionalidadde la Ley Orgdnicadel PoderPopular, in
BREWER-CARIAS ET AL, supra note 120, at 509-93.
123. See Allan R. Brewer-Carias, Introduccidn general al rigimen del Poder Populary
del Estado Comunal (0 de c6mo en el siglo XX, en Venezuela se decreta al margen de la
Constitucion, un Estado de Comunas y de Consejos Comunales y se establece una sociedad
socialista y un sistema econdmico comunita, por los cuales nadie ha votado), in BREWERCARIAS ET AL., supra note 120, at 9-182.

380

Duquesne Law Review

Vol. 51

the "primary political units of the national organization."12 4 The
exercise of Popular Power is made through the Communes, as an
expression of the exercise of popular sovereignty, although not
through representatives. It is therefore a political system in
which representative democracy is ignored, openly violating the
Constitution.
The Socialist State or Communal State sought to be established
through these laws, in parallel to the Constitutional State, is supposedly based on Article 5 of the Constitution that provides that
"[siovereignty resides untransferably in the people, who exercise it
directly as provided in this Constitution and the Law, and indirectly, by suffrage, through the organs exercising Public Power."1 2 5
Instead, it is has been created through by-passing the basic rule of
the Constitutional State structure grounded on the concept of representative democracy, that is, the exercise of sovereignty indirectly through the vote.
The Communal State is now structured based only on the supposedly direct exercise of sovereignty 2 6 through the Communes,
"with an economic model of social property and endogenous sustainable development that allows reaching the supreme social
happiness of the Venezuelan people in a socialist society."12 7
What is being sought is to establish a Socialist or Communal
State alongside the Constitutional State-the first supposedly
based on the direct exercise of sovereignty by the people; and the
second based on the indirect exercise of sovereignty by the people
through elected representatives by universal suffrage; in a system
in which the former will gradually strangle and empty competencies from the latter. All of this is contrary to the Constitution,
particularly because in the structure of the Communal State that
124. CONSTITUTION OF THE BOLIVARIAN REPUBLIC OF VENEZUELA (1999), art. 168.
125. Id. at art. 5.
126. This has even been "legitimized" by the Supreme Tribunal Constitutional Chamber's decisions analyzing the organic character of the laws, such as the one issued in connection with the Organic Law of Municipalities. See Decision No. 1.330, Case: Organic
17, 2010, available at
Communes, Dec.
Character of the Law of the
http://www.tsj.gov.ve/decisiones/scon/Diciembre/1330-171210-2010-10-1436.html.
127. Organic Law on the Popular Power, art. 8.8, GACETA OFICIAL No. 6.011, EXTRA.,
Dec. 21, 2010. The Organic Law of Municipalities, however, defines the Communal State at
article 4.10 as follows: "From of sociopolitical organization, based on the democratic and
social state of law and justice established in the Constitution of the Republic, whose power is exercised directly by the people through communal self governments, with an economic model of social property and endogenous and sustainable development that achieves the supreme social happiness of the Venezuelan people in a socialist
society. Forming the basic unit of the Communal State is the commune."
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is established, in the end, the exercise of sovereignty is factually
indirect, through supposed "representatives" members of the
Communal Councils that are not popularly elected through universal and direct suffrage, but "elected" in Citizens' Assemblies.128
They are the ones called to exercise Popular Power in the name of
the people, with the name of "spokespersons," but that as already
mentioned, are not elected through universal, secret and direct
suffrage.
This system is directly controlled by a Ministry from the National Executive Branch of Government. Far from being an instrument of participation and decentralization-a concept that is
indissolubly linked to political autonomy-it is a centralized and
tightly controlled system of the communities by the central power,
in which the members of the communal councils, the communes
and all organizations of the Popular Power are not elected but
"appointed" through a show of hands by assemblies controlled by
the official party and the executive branch.
This Communal State system, which exists in parallel to the
Constitutional State, is structured on a unique concept which is
socialism, so that anyone who is not a socialist is automatically
discriminated against. Under the framework of these laws, it is
not possible, therefore, to reconcile pluralism and the principle of
non-discrimination on grounds of "political opinion" guaranteed by
the Constitution with the provisions of these Law pursuing the
opposite, that is, the establishment of a Communal State whose
bodies can only act on the basis of socialism and in which any citizen who has another opinion is excluded. Thus, through these
Organic Laws, in a way evidently contrary to the Constitution, the
defining framework of a new model of a state parallel and different from the Constitutional State has been established, called the
Communal State, based exclusively on socialism as the political
doctrine and practice.
Regarding the Communal State, on the other hand, article 5 of
the Organic Law on the Popular Power states that the "people's
organization and participation in exercising its sovereignty is
based on Simon Bolivar the Liberator's doctrine, and is based on
socialist principles and values,"12-a link that, as aforementioned,
128. See on the Organic Law on the Communal Councils, Claudia Nikken, La Ley Orgdnica de los Consejos Comanales y el derecho a la participacionciudadana en los asuntos
publicos, in BREWER-CARIAS, ET AL., supra note 120, at 183-358.
129. Organic Law on the Popular Power, art. 5, supra note 127. The same expression
was used in the Organic Law of the Communes with respect to their constitution, shaping
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is untenable. This law links the organization of the Communal
State (established in parallel to the Constitutional State) with the
socialist political ideology, for which purpose the Law defined socialism, as:
a mode of social relations of production, centered in coexistence with solidarity and the satisfaction of material and intangible needs of all of society, which has as fundamental basis, the recuperation of the value of work as a producer of
goods and services to meet human needs and achieve supreme
social happiness and integral human development. This requires the development of social ownership of the basic and
strategic means of production, so that all families, Venezuelan
citizens, possess, use and enjoy their patrimony, individual or
family property, and exercise full enjoyment of their economic,
social, political and cultural rights."'o
Article 7 of the same Organic Law on the Popular Power defines
as a purpose of the Popular Power, to strengthen "the organization
of the people in order to consolidate the revolutionary democracy
and build the bases of a socialist society, democratic, of law and
justice," and to "establish the bases that allow organized communities to exercise social comptrollership to ensure that the investment of public resources is efficiently performed for the collective
benefit; and monitor that the activities of the private sector with
social impact develop within legal rules that protect users and
consumers.""'s This, of course, is a well-known procedure established in other authoritarian regimes in order to construct a general system of social espionage to be developed among peoples in
order to institutionalize the denunciation and persecution of any
deviation regarding the socialist framework imposed on the citi-

zenship.132
and functioning (art. 2), in the Communal Council's Law (art. 1) and in the Organic Law of
Social Comptrollership (art. 6).
130. Id. at art. 8.14. The same definition is found in Article 4.14 of the Organic Law of
the Communes. Many are the definitions of socialism, but in all, its basic elements can be
identified: (i) a system of social and economic organization, (ii) based on collective or State
ownership and administration of the means of production, and (iii) State regulation of economic and social activities and distribution of goods, (iv) seeking the gradual disappearance
of social classes.
131. Organic Law on the Popular Power, supra note 127, art. 7.
132. See Luis A. Herrera Orellana, La Ley Orgdnica de ContraloriaSocial: Funcionalizaci6n de la participacidne instauraci6nde la desconfianza ciudadana, in BREWER-CARIAS
ET AL., supra note 120, at 361 passim.
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According to the Law of the Communes, 133 these communes are
conceived as a "local entity" or "socialist space" of the Communal
State, where citizens exercise the Popular Power." 134 Nonetheless,
according to the Constitution, this expression of "local entity" can
only be applied to local political entities of the Constitutional
State with autonomous and self-governments entities composed of
elected representatives by universal, direct and secret ballot.135
This means that there can be no "local entities" directed by persons that are not elected by the people but appointed by other bodies.
And this is precisely what happens with the so-called "governments of the communes." Under this legislation on Popular Power
and its organizations, the origin of the Communes is not secured
through democratic representative election by universal, direct
and secret suffrage. Thus, the conception of the Communes in this
organic law is an unconstitutional conception.
Within the areas of communal power, the law has specifically
regulated the communal economy that must be developed "under
communal forms of social ownership, to satisfy collective needs,
social reinvestment of the surplus, and contribute to the country's
overall social development in a sustainable manner." 3 This area
of public power has been regulated by the Organic Law of the
Communal Economic System,137 which must be developed exclusively through "socio-productive organizations under communal
social property forms" created as public enterprises, family productive units, or bartering groups, in which private initiative and
private property are excluded. This system radically changes the
mixed economic system of the 1999 constitutional framework, substituting it with a state-controlled economic system, mixed with
provisions belonging to primitive societies. The statute even provides for the creation of local or "communal" currencies in a society that must be ruled only "by socialist principles and values" that
133.

See GACETA OFICIAL No. 6.011, ExTRA., Dec. 21, 2010.

134.

Law of the Communes, supra note 120, art. 1.

135.

CONSTITUTION OF THE BOLIvARIAN REPUBLIC OF VENEZUELA (1999), art. 169.

136.

Law of the Communes, supra note 130, art. 18.

137.

See GACETA OFICIAL No. 6.011, EXTRA., Dec. 21, 2010.

On this law, see Allan R.

Brewer-Carias, Sobre la Ley Orgdnica del Sistema Econ6mico Comunal o de c6mo se implanta en Venezuela un sistema econ6mico comunista sin reformar la Constituci6n, 124
REVISTA DE DERECHO P(JBLICO 102 (2010); Jesis Maria Alvarado Andrade, La "Constituci6n Econ6mica",y el sistema econ6mico comunal (Reflexiones criticas a prop6sito de la Ley
Orgdnica del Sistema econ6mico Comunal), in BREWER-CARtAS, ET AL., supra note 120, at
375-456.
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the Law declares to be inspired, without any historical support, on
the "Sim6n Bolivar's doctrine."'
The socialist productive model established in the Law, is precisely defined as a "production model based on social property, oriented towards the elimination of the social division of work that
appertains to the capitalist model,"'3 9 directed to satisfy "the increasing needs of the population through new means of generation
and appropriation as well as the reinvestment of social surplus."4 0
This is nothing different than to legally impose a communist system by copying isolated paragraphs perhaps of a forgotten old
manual of a failed communist revolution, paraphrasing what Karl
Marx and Friedrich Engels wrote 170 years ago (1845-1846) on
the "communist society,"41 precisely based upon those three basic concepts: the social property of production means, the elimination of social
division of work, and the social reinvestment of surplus.142
VI. SOME CONCLUSIONS

This Communal State, regulated on the fringes of the Constitution, has been established through ordinary legislation as a parallel State to the Constitutional State. The provisions of the Communal State, which are in the process of being implemented, will
enable the Communal State to drown the Constitutional State, for
which purpose the Law has provided that all organs of the Constitutional State that exercise Public Power are subjected to the
mandates of the organizations of Popular Power. This establishes
a new principle of government the so-called principle of "govern
obeying," which is nothing other than obeying the wishes of the

central government.143
The Popular Power organizations have no political autonomy,
since their "spokespersons" are not democratically elected by universal, direct and secret ballot, but are rather appointed by citizen
138. Organic Law of the Communal Economic System, supra note 130, art. 5.
139. Id. at art. 3.2.

140. Id. at art. 6.12.
141. - See KARL MARX & FRIEDRICH ENGELS, The German Ideology, in 5 COLLECTIVE
WORKS 47 (1976), available at http://www.educa.madrid.org/cms-tools/files/0a24636f-764c4e03-9cld-6722e2ee60d7/Texto%2OMarx%20y%2OEngels.pdf.
142. Organic Law of the Communal Economic System, supra note 130, art. 1.
143. Article 24 of the law establishes the following principle: "Proceedings of the bodies
and entities of Public Power. All organs, entities and agencies of Public Power will govern
their actions by the principle of 'govern obeying,' in relation to the mandates of the people
and organizations of Popular Power, according to the provisions in the Constitution of the
Republic and the laws." Id.
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Assemblies politically controlled and operated by the governing
party and the National Executive. The National Executive controls and guides all the organizational process of the Communal
State in the sphere of socialist ideology, thus there is no way there
can be a spokesperson who is not a socialist. Consequently, with
the implementation of the Communal State, the decentralization
principle of the Constitution eventually will be completely abandoned."
Consequently, this "govern obeying" principle is a limitation to
the political autonomy of the elected bodies of the Constitutional
State such as the National Assembly, Governors and Legislative
Councils of States and Mayors and Municipal Councils. It is these
groups upon whom ultimately is imposed an obligation to obey any
decision adopted by the National Government and the ruling party, framed exclusively in the socialist sphere as a political doctrine.
Therefore, in the unconstitutional framework of these Popular
Power Laws, the popular will expressed in the election of representatives of the Constitutional State bodies has no value whatsoever. The sovereignty of the people has been confiscated by transferring it to assemblies who do not represent them.
With this "Organic Laws of Popular Power" framework, there is
no doubt about the political decision taken in December 21, 2010
by the completely delegitimized National Assembly. That National Assembly, elected in 2005, no longer represented the majority of
the popular will as it was expressed in the September 26, 2010
legislative election, which was instead lodged against the President of the Republic, the National Assembly itself and socialist
policies they have developed. These policies are designed to impose on Venezuelans, against popular will and defrauding the
Constitution, a Socialist State model, called "the Communal State"
and conceived as a Socialist State. While these steps are taken
supposedly to exercise Popular Power directly by the people as an
alleged form of direct exercise of sovereignty, this is not true because it is instead exercised through "spokespersons" who supposedly "represent" them but without being elected in universal, direct and secret suffrage.
144. See Jos6 Ignacio Hernindez G., Descentralizaci6n y Poder Popular, in BREWERCARfAS, ET AL., supra note 120, at 457-73; Adriana Vigilanza Garcia, La descentralizacidn
politica de Venezuela y las nuevas Leyes del "Poder Popular", in BREWER-CARAS, ET AL.,
supranote 120, at 475-505.
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By regulating this Communal State of the Popular Power
through ordinary legislation, in addition to defrauding the Constitution, a technique that has been consistently applied by the authoritarian regime in Venezuela since 1999 to impose its decisions
outside of the Venezuelan Constitution,"' it now adds fraud to the
popular will by imposing on Venezuelans through organic laws a
state model for which nobody has voted.
The new state framework radically and unconstitutionally
changes the text of the 1999 Constitution, which has not been reformed as the regime had wished in 2007. These steps are taken
in open contradiction to the popular rejection that the majority
expressed in the referendum of December 2, 2007, even in violation of the Constitution, and in defiance of the popular rejection of
the socialist policies of the President to the Republic and his National Assembly on the occasion of the parliamentary elections of
September, 26 2010.
What is clear about all this is that there are no masks to deceive
anyone, or any reason for someone to pretend to be deceived or
fooled about what essentially the "Bolivarian revolution" is. It is
nothing other. than a communist Marxist revolution, carried out
deliberately by misusing and defrauding constitutional institutions, which subsist due to the abstention or omission of the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Tribunal to exercise its power
of judicial review.

145. See ALLAN R. BREWER-CARIAS,
CONSTITUCI6N (1999-2009) (2009).
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